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Summary
This report examines the growing threat of transnational organized crime to U.S.
national security and global stability.  The end of the Cold War — along with
increasing globalization beginning in the 1990s — has helped criminal organizations
expand their activities and gain global reach.  Criminal networks are believed to have
benefitted from the weakening of certain government institutions, more open borders,
and the resurgence of ethnic and regional conflicts across the former Soviet Union
and many other regions.  Transnational criminal organizations have also exploited
expanding financial markets and rapid technological developments.  In addition,
terrorist networks are believed to be increasingly supporting themselves through
traditional crime, and have been linked to criminal organizations.  Alliances between
the two groups could amplify threats to American security.  Transnational criminals
engage in a spectrum of illicit activities, including narcotics and arms smuggling,
trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and money laundering and other financial
crimes.
The report also outlines the U.S. response to international crime.  While U.S.
policy is framed within the 1998 International Crime Control Strategy, it is also
shaped by other more recent federal and agency plans.  Agencies heading government
efforts include the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, and Homeland
Security.  Key federal programs and initiatives and their interagency coordination are
discussed.  International cooperation and agreements are vital to U.S. strategy; also,
many programs seek to assist and train foreign law enforcement.  Finally, this report
examines likely Congressional concerns related to U.S. efforts to combat
transnational crime.  The report will not be updated.
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1 This refers to money laundering.  While money laundering has no official definition, the
international police organization Interpol defines it as “any act or attempted act to conceal
or disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated
from legitimate sources.”
[http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/default.asp].
2 Michael Camdessus, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, “Money
Laundering: The Importance of International Countermeasures,” (address before the
Financial Action Task Force, February 10, 1998).  Another study (using different criteria)
estimated that laundered funds comprised about 10% of world GDP.  Schneider, Friedrich,
and Enste, Dominik, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences,” The Journal
of Economic Literature, vol. 38, no. 1, 2000. 
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Background
Starting in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the advent of
globalization, many criminal organizations ramped up their operations and expanded
them worldwide.  These organizations are believed to have been helped by
weakening government institutions in some countries, more open borders, and the
resurgence of ethnic and regional conflicts across the former Soviet Union and many
other regions.  Crime networks have exploited expanding trade and financial markets,
while benefitting from rapidly advancing technology, broadened international travel,
and improved global communications.  Mainly due to its clandestine nature,
international crime is hard to measure.  By the most conservative estimates, criminal
proceeds1 comprise between two and five percent of global gross domestic product
(GDP).2 
Transnational organized crime tends to develop in nations where law
enforcement institutions are weak and citizens have limited economic alternatives.
Farmers frequently turn to drug cultivation, boosting the international narcotics trade.
Unemployed citizens seek work abroad and fall victim to people-trafficking rings.
Across the globe, government corruption and illicit trade fuel and sustain each other.
Transnational crime is believed to most frequently originate in regions such as
sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and the Caribbean, but
its effects are global.  Many experts maintain that terrorists are increasingly funding
themselves through crime.  They have been linked with criminal groups in money
laundering, counterfeiting, and other activities.  Collaboration between the two
groups could heighten threats to the United States and its interests.
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3 Gerhard O. W. Mueller, “Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts,” Transnational
Organized Crime, vol. 4, Autumn/Winter 1998.
4 The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.  Available at
[http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_convention.html].
5 Louise Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism,”
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Winter/Spring 2005.
6 Dow Jones Newswires, “Peru’s Ex-Spy Chief Convicted of Extortion,” March 2, 2005.
7 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, March 2005.
Definitions
There is no single accepted definition of transnational organized crime.  In 1994,
researchers defined “transnational crime” to include offences whose inception,
prevention, and/or direct or indirect effects involve more than one country.3  Experts
believe transnational organized crime networks vary considerably in structure,
strength, size, geographical range, and the scope and diversity of their operations.
The United Nations sought a suitably broad definition in its Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, to which the United States became a party in
December 2005.  According to the U.N., organized crime groups consist of “three or
more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of
committing one or more serious crimes or offenses ... in order to obtain, directly or
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”4
Traditional vs. Modern Networks.  Definitions of transnational organized
crime often differentiate between traditional crime organizations and more modern
criminal networks.  Traditional groups have a hierarchical structure that operates
continuously or for an extended period.  Newer networks, in contrast, are seen as
having a more decentralized, often cell-like structure.  Some experts also distinguish
groups by their relation to the state.  Many conventional organizations have interests
that are aligned with countries; they depend on the state for contracts and services.5
They may have repeatedly laundered their assets through legitimate businesses.
Modern networks, in contrast, are seen as less likely to profit from state contracts or
launder large sums of money.  They often thrive on the absence of effective
governance. 
Organized crime can involve top officials.  For example, Vladimiro Montesinos,
head of Peru’s national intelligence and anti-narcotics efforts between 1990 and
2000, is now imprisoned, charged with running major international drug, weapons,
and money laundering operations.6  In addition, some states, such as North Korea, are
accused of participating in organized crime as a matter of state policy.7   
Organized Crime vs. Terrorism.  Definitions of organized crime and
terrorism sometimes overlap.  Both groups frequently operate in decentralized cell
structures, tend to target civilians, and use similar tactics such as kidnapping and
drug dealing.  Many experts distinguish the groups by motive: criminals are driven
by financial gain and terrorists by political, sometimes religious goals.  But clearly
discerning groups’ motives can be challenging.  Terrorists are increasingly seen as
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8 David E. Kaplan, “Paying for Terror: How Jihadist Groups are Using Organized Crime
Tactics — and Its Profits — to Finance Attacks on Targets Around the Globe,” U.S. News
and World Report, December 12, 2005.
9 Treasury Department Assistant Secretary Juan Zarata, Treasury Department press release,
February 1, 2005. 
10 Rollie Lal, “Terrorists and Organized Crime Join Forces,” International Herald Tribune,
May 24, 2005.
11 “A Taliban-linked man who allegedly sought to poison U.S. streets with millions of
dollars of heroin in a deadly ‘American jihad’ has become the first person extradited from
Afghanistan to face federal charges.”  The Associated Press, “U.S. Extradites Accused Drug
Dealer from Afghanistan,” October 25, 2005.
12 Testimony of Karen P. Tandy, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, before
the House International Relations Committee, February 12, 2004.
13 Testimony of Asa Hutchinson, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration,
Department of Justice, before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and
Government Information, the Senate Judiciary Committee, March 13, 2002.
supporting themselves through criminal activity.8  Funding for the March 2003
Madrid train attacks, for instance, came from drug dealing.9  Some crime bosses also
appear to dabble in terror.  The Dubai-based Indian mobster Aftab Ansari, for
example, is believed to have helped fund the September 11 attacks with ransom
money earned from kidnapping.10  Further, definitions merge because a growing
number of extremists may feel justified in committing the criminal activities
themselves, on the grounds that such acts square with their ultimate “terrorist” aims.11
Narco-Terrorism.  Some 17 of the 41 State Department-designated foreign
terrorist organizations engage in “narco-terrorism,” according to the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA).12  Many experts believe the term “narcoterrorism” was
first used by former Peruvian President Belaúnde Terry in the early 1980s to describe
terrorist-like tactics used against Peruvian law enforcement by Shining Path Marxist
rebels.  While narco-terrorism has no formal definition, it is generally used to
describe activities by groups that use drug trafficking to fund terrorism.  For the
DEA, it is “a subset of terrorism,” in which groups or individuals participate directly
or indirectly in the “cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of
controlled substances and the money derived from these activities.”13
Some consider the term too broad.  By various definitions, narco-terrorism could
be applied to a wide range of groups, ranging from guerrilla organizations such as the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which earns hundreds of millions
of dollars annually from cocaine, to small, fledgling terrorist cells.  Some claim the
term’s use may occasionally reflect political motives.
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14 International Crime Threat Assessment. 
[http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/pub45270index.html].
15 Interview with an Administration official, November 2005.  The official projected that the
reassessment would be complete “in early 2006.”  Based partly on the results, the NSC
Policy Coordination Committee on international crime may revise the 1998 International
Crime Control Strategy.
16 For more information, see CRS Report RL30699, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, by Sharon A. Squassoni.
17 Testimony of Rensselaer Lee, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, before
the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks, House Homeland
Security Committee, September 22, 2005.
18 Regarding nuclear terrorism, including the threat of radiological dispersal devices, or
“dirty bombs,” see CRS Report RL32595, Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats
and Responses, by Jonathan Medalia; and CRS Report RS21766, Radiological Dispersal
Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management, by Dana Shea.
19 Mathew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, “Controlling Nuclear Warheads and
Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan,” Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard
University, March 2003, pp. 18-23.
Threats to the United States
Mainly because it is clandestine, transnational crime is hard to measure.  The
U.S. government’s International Crime Threat Assessment,14 completed in 2000,
gauges various global criminal activities and was drafted by an interagency working
group led by the National Security Council (NSC).  Based on this assessment, which
is currently under review by the NSC,15 and other more recent reports, the largest
international crime threats, in terms of their potential impact, include (1) smuggling
of nuclear materials and technology; (2) drug trafficking; (3) trafficking in persons;
(4) intellectual property crimes; and (5) money laundering. 
! Many experts fear organized criminals will help terrorists or nation
states acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Among WMD
threats,16 many experts believe the most menacing is that terrorists
could develop and use a nuclear bomb.17  In regions such as the
former Soviet Union, the security of nuclear material has been
criticized as lax.  The State Department, to allay concerns that
former Soviet scientists could be bribed by criminal networks, runs
nonweapons-related projects in Russia and Ukraine to keep them
employed.  The risk of nuclear smuggling was highlighted in
October 2003 when officials in international intelligence and law
enforcement discovered that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan
was selling nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya, and other
unknown parties.18  In one scenario, a nuclear attack on a U.S. city
could kill more than half a million people and cause more than $1
trillion in damage.19 
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20 “Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000,” Journal of the American Medical
Association, vol. 291, no. 10, March 10, 2004, pp. 1238, 1241.
21 Drug Enforcement Agency, “Speaking Out Against Drug Legalization.”
[http://www.dea.gov/demand/speakout/director.htm].
22 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, 2005, p. 13. June 3, 2005.
[http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005].
23 Ibid.
24 Testimony of John P. Torres, Deputy Assistant Director, Smuggling and Public Safety,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. DHS, before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Judiciary Committee, May 18, 2004.
25 Interpol, “The Impact and Scale of Counterfeiting.” [http://www.interpol.com/Public/
News/Factsheet51pr21.asp].
26 Ibid.
27 Testimony of James E. Mendenhall, Acting General Counsel, Office of the United States
Trade Representative, before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Senate Judiciary
Committee, May 25, 2005.
! Every year illegal drugs kill about 17,000 Americans.20  Illicit drugs
are estimated to impose about $160 billion in social and economic
costs and $67 billion in direct costs to the United States annually.21
The illicit drug trade is believed to be valued at between $500 and
$900 billion worldwide.  Analysts identify cocaine and heroin
trafficking as the most profitable criminal activity for transnational
groups. 
! Trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation or forced labor is one
of organized crime’s largest revenue sources, generating $9.5 billion
annually, according to the FBI.  An estimated 600,000 to 800,000
people are trafficked across international borders annually.  When
combined with domestic trafficking, the total is believed to be
between two and four million.22  About 14,500 to 17,500 people are
thought to be trafficked into the United States annually,23 mainly
from Southeast Asia and the former Soviet Union.  In principle, the
term “human smuggling” is distinct from “trafficking in persons.”
In human smuggling, migrants pay to cross international borders.
Experts fear human smugglers may help terrorists enter the United
States and other countries.24 
! IP violations are thought to distort international trade and cause
extensive revenue losses to legitimate industries.  According to
Interpol, trade in counterfeit goods has grown eight times faster than
legitimate trade since the early 1990s.25  U.S. businesses estimate
that counterfeiting costs them between $200 and $250 billion per
year in lost sales.26  In China, industry estimates place piracy levels
in many sectors at about 90 percent.27 
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28 Money laundering is “the act of transferring illegally obtained money through legitimate
persons or accounts so that its original source cannot be traced,” Black’s Law Dictionary
1027 (8th ed. 2004).
29 Michael Camdessus, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, “Money
Laundering: The Importance of International Countermeasures,” (address before the
Financial Action Task Force, February 10, 1998).  Another study (using different criteria)
estimated that laundered funds comprised about 10% of world GDP.  Schneider, Friedrich,
and Enste, Dominik, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences,” The Journal
of Economic Literature, vol. 38, no. 1, 2000. 
30 National Security Council, International Crime Control Strategy, June 1998.
[http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/iccs.pdf].
31 The eight goals are to:  1) Extend the first line of defense beyond U.S. borders; 2) Protect
U.S. borders by attacking smuggling and smuggling-related crimes; 3) Deny safe haven to
international criminals; 4) Counter international financial crime; 5) Prevent criminal
exploitation of international trade; 6) Respond to emerging international crime threats; 7)
Foster international cooperation and the rule of law; and 8) Optimize the full range of U.S.
efforts. 
32 The Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) was established by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.
33 Conversation with an Administration official, November 2005.  The PCC is reviewing the
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! Many criminal organizations hide the traces of their illegal activities
by directly and indirectly investing their profits in legitimate
financial institutions.28  In bulk cash smuggling, criminals place their
profits in jurisdictions with lax financial regulations and law
enforcement.  By highly conservative estimates, money laundering
is valued at two to five percent of world GDP.29 
U.S. Policy Response
Framework
The International Crime Control Strategy (ICCS), released in June 1998, has
framed related policies of both the Clinton and Bush Administrations.30  It was
created by multiple agencies, led by the National Security Council, in response to
Presidential Decision Directive 42 (PDD-42), issued in October 1995.
It consists of eight broad goals,31 and is intended to complement, not supplant,
a variety of related documents such as the National Drug Control and National
Security Strategies.  It aims to assist in “integrating all facets of the federal response
to international crime.”  To assist in policy coordination and other initiatives related
to transnational crime, a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC)32 was established
within the National Security Council (NSC) in April 2001.  The PCC is currently
discussing whether to produce an updated crime strategy.  A significant question is
whether federal agencies are adequately integrating efforts — such as those relating
to international crime and terrorism — on their own.33
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33 (...continued)
International Crime Threat Assessment, last published in 2000.  Based on this reassessment,
which is expected to be completed in “early 2006,” and on separate discussions, PCC
officials will determine the need to produce a revised 1998 International Crime Control
Strategy.  
34 See CRS Report RL32595, Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses,
by Jonathan Medalia.
35 See CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S.
Programs in the Former Soviet Union, by Amy F. Woolf.
Key Federal Programs and Initiatives
A host of federal agencies, frequently in coordination, run programs to fight
transnational organized crime.  Leading agencies include the Departments of Justice,
State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Defense, and Commerce.  Many programs
involve foreign cooperation.  Below are descriptions of programs and initiatives to
combat five principal transnational crime areas.  Agency roles are expanded upon in
this report’s appendix.
Nuclear Smuggling.  The U.S. response to nuclear smuggling is often termed
a “layered defense.”  It aims to stop nuclear material moving toward U.S. borders at
a number of steps along the way.  While anti-smuggling efforts are primarily led by
the State Department, agencies including the Departments of Defense, Energy,
Homeland Security, and Commerce play crucial roles.34
The State and Defense Departments lead coordination of the Proliferation
Security Initiative.  Announced by President Bush in May 2003, it creates
international agreements and partnerships to permit the United States and its allies
to search planes and ships suspected of carrying nuclear material or technologies.
The DOD-managed Cooperative Threat Reduction program works to destroy nuclear
weapons, especially in the former Soviet Union.  The State Department also manages
the International Science and Technology Centers in Russia and Ukraine to help
employ scientists with nonweapons-related projects.  In addition, DOE’s
International Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program secures nuclear
material through activities such as upgrading security at nuclear sites, consolidating
material into more secure locations, and improving nuclear smuggling detection
capabilities at borders.
The President’s FY2007 budget requests about $1.12 billion for U.S. programs
that provide nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia and other
former Soviet states; $1.02 billion was appropriated for such programs in FY2006.
The FY2007 request includes $372.1 million for DOD’s Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs, down from $415.5 million in FY2006.  It also includes $675
million for Energy Department WMD threat-reduction efforts and $75 million for
comparable State Department funding, up from $530 million and $71 million,
respectively, in FY2006.35
   
Drug Trafficking.  The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) leads other agencies including the Departments
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36 Other funding sources for the Andean region include the Foreign Military Financing
program and the International Military Education and Training program, both State
Department-managed.  The Defense Department also has a counternarcotics account for
worldwide programs involving interdiction, training, equipment, and intelligence sharing.
From FY2000 through FY2005, the Departments of State and Defense provided the Andean
region with about $5.4 billion in counternarcotics-related assistance.  For more information,
see CRS Report RL33253, Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding
Programs: FY2006 Assistance, by Connie Veillette. 
37 For more information on drug trafficking issues, see CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug
Control: International Policy and Approaches, by Raphael Perl. 
38 See CRS Report RL30545, Trafficking in Persons: The U.S. and the International
Response, by Francis Miko.
39 These standards are defined in the Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 and
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-193).
of Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense, in coordinating U.S. anti-drug programs
and initiatives.  U.S. counternarcotics efforts center primarily on foreign crop
eradication and global narcotics interdiction.  The State Department and other
agencies help eradicate crops by providing foreign countries with equipment and
supplies.  
INL also manages the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), the primary U.S.
program supporting counternarcotics and economic development in the Andean
region.  ACI funding from FY2000 through FY2004 totals about $3.5 billion.36
Congress appropriated $731 million for ACI in FY2005 and $734.5 million in
FY2006.  The White House’s FY2007 request is for $721.5 million.
 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and other Justice Department officials play
a central role in bringing smugglers to face justice in the United States through
extradition, a significant judicial tool in combating narcotics.  DEA agents also
cooperate with 58 foreign governments in activities such as bilateral investigations,
institution building, and training.37 
Trafficking in Persons.  Interagency anti-trafficking efforts are led by the
State Department.  Other agencies, including the Departments of Justice, Homeland
Security, Health and Human Services, and Labor, also play key roles.38
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386),
signed into law October 28, 2000, contains a number of key anti-trafficking
provisions.  One establishes an annual State Department Trafficking in Persons
Report.  First issued in July 2001, it reviews anti-trafficking trends and rates
countries’ anti-trafficking efforts.  The act also authorizes the President to impose
sanctions, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223),
against countries that do not meet anti-trafficking “minimum standards.”39
On January 10, 2006, the President signed the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-164).  Among other things, the bill aims to
assist foreign trafficking victims in the United States, address the needs of child
victims, and develop anti-trafficking programs in post-conflict situations and foreign
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humanitarian emergencies.  It authorizes $188 million in 2006 and $173 million in
2007 to combat human trafficking.  
Intellectual Property (IP) Crimes.  The Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) leads other agencies, including the Departments of
Commerce, State, Justice, and Homeland Security, in combating IP violations.   
A centerpiece of U.S. efforts to strengthen intellectual property enforcement is
the annual USTR-led “Special 301" process,40 which seeks to identify countries
lacking adequate intellectual property protection.  USTR also manages several tariff
preference programs, such as the Generalized System of Preferences.41  Many U.S.
anti-piracy initiatives involve forging international agreements, often through the
World Trade Organization (WTO).  Through the WTO, the USTR can initiate
dispute settlement proceedings against foreign governments and institutions; a
stringent WTO membership application process also promotes tougher IP laws.
Money Laundering.  U.S. anti-money laundering efforts are led by the
Treasury Department.  Other key agencies include the Departments of Justice and
Homeland Security. 
The Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) and its
subsidiary bureaus safeguard domestic and foreign financial systems through
financial sanctions, financial regulation and supervision, international initiatives,
private sector outreach, law enforcement support, and other methods.  TFI offices
such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) support U.S. law
enforcement agencies in international financial crime investigations and provide U.S.
policymakers with global money laundering analyses.  FinCEN and other Treasury
affiliates cooperate with 32 foreign government institutions to improve international
money laundering standards through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  At
the Justice Department, the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section guides
other agencies on money laundering-related investigations and prosecutions.
Criminal Investigations  
The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security lead a handful of agencies
in transnational crime investigations. 
Domestic.  Within the Justice Department, the Criminal Division’s Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section (OCRS) provides prosecutors to the Crime Strike
Force Units of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, which supervise investigations and
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with U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies to facilitate the necessary flow of
information and evidence among these agencies, and to counsel U.S. agents on
timing and strategy issues.  The FBI Organized Crime program places Special Agents
in domestic field offices to investigate criminal organizations within their
jurisdiction.  Joint task forces composed of federal, state, and local law enforcement
officials allow the FBI to pool additional resources to combat organized crime.43
The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the Department of
Homeland Security’s largest investigative bureau.  Within ICE, the Office of
Investigations has a mission of investigating crimes including alien smuggling,
narcotics and contraband smuggling, and financial crimes.44  The Financial
Investigations Division focuses on financial crime; the Smuggling/Trafficking
Branch disrupts and prosecutes criminal organizations involved in human smuggling
or trafficking in persons; and the Contraband Smuggling Branch focuses its
investigations on organized smuggling groups.
International.  Justice and DHS also lead several efforts to promote
international investigative cooperation.  Many foreign investigations, for example,
are coordinated through the FBI’s Office of International Operations.  In the Legal
Attaché program, FBI agents are stationed in more than 50 countries.  They train
foreign law enforcement personnel and, in return, receive foreign cooperation in
gathering evidence related to crimes such as drug trafficking.45
U.S. participation in Interpol, perhaps the preeminent global anti-crime
organization, is also Justice- and DHS-led.  Interpol investigates transnational crime
and promotes cooperation among international law enforcement institutions.  A
National Central Bureau (NCB) in every Interpol member country serves as the single
point of contact for cooperating in overseas criminal investigations.  Each member
country staffs its Bureau with its own law enforcement officials who are authorized
to act within its jurisdiction.  DOJ and DHS jointly control the USNCB, which
coordinates U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts.46
Foreign Law Enforcement Training and Assistance
Interagency efforts to train and assist foreign officials, a major component of
combating international crime, are led by the State Department’s Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).
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Through INL’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
Global Anticrime Programs, for example, multiple U.S. agencies assist and train
foreign governments to investigate and prosecute drug trafficking and other crimes.
INL also leads interagency coordination of the International Law Enforcement
Academies (ILEAs).47  ILEAs have trained over 13,000 officials and promoted
regional legal cooperation in 68 African, Asian, European, and Latin American
countries.
Issues for Policy Consideration
Coordinating Crime and Terror Policies
Some analysts question whether agencies are giving adequate priority to
international crime, given the heightened U.S. focus on terrorism since the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  Some believe the National Security Council has been slow
in leading a government-wide effort to update or revise the International Crime
Control Strategy, released in 1998.48  Some agencies have argued, however, that
federal coordination of anti-crime efforts are most effectively led by top agency
officials.49
Many experts believe a more coordinated law enforcement and intelligence
approach would better combat both international crime and terrorism.  They point to
better coordination in areas such as money laundering, drug trafficking, and human
smuggling.  According to some experts, criminals could be effective witnesses or
informants against terrorists.  Terrorists may avoid organized criminal organizations,
many experts believe, if association with them increases their risk of capture.
Terrorists may instead commit petty crime or operate smaller, less sophisticated
crime rings. According to European law enforcement officials, terrorist cells
throughout the Continent commit crimes ranging from smuggling to car theft to
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selling pirated CDs.50  Many experts urge enhanced cooperation between intelligence
and law enforcement at all levels, including local police departments.51
Measuring Performance
Individual agencies can currently create their own measurement systems on
crime-related programs.52  Some analysts have called for gauging anti-crime efforts
through a broader interagency mechanism.  Such a system, they argue, could give
individual agencies some flexibility in controlling their programs.  Agencies may
point to the difficulties of obtaining solid international crime data.  A recent
interagency report on one crime area — money laundering — cited additional
challenges and  concluded that accurately quantifying seized assets is “currently not
possible.”53  Reasons include the incompatibility of individual agency tracking
systems, varying types of data collected, definitional disparities, and redundant
recording of seizures among agencies.  Many experts believe adequate data collection
underlies any successful performance measurement system.
Enhancing Multilateral Cooperation
Some experts propose expanding U.S. efforts through large multilateral
institutions, such as the United Nations.  Some consider multinational conventions
to be a valuable tool in improving global law enforcement standards.  Others are
more skeptical about such treaties.  Adherence varies, they point out, and
enforcement is frequently lacking.  Some analysts believe U.S. efforts are better spent
working with small groups of more trusted partners.  Some, for example, believe
collective decision-making would be more effective through the Group of Eight (G8).
Some argue that with more frequent meetings and improved enforcement, the
intergovernmental body and similar structures could be more flexible in adapting to
and fighting transnational threats. 
Many believe large international organizations are hindered by bureaucracy.
Some analysts advocate increased efforts through less structured partnerships.  For
example, the Proliferation Security Initiative has no formal bureaucracy; it has
instead been described as a loose organization of key partners.  It is this structure,
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some maintain,54 that has enabled PSI participants to take faster, more effective
action following discoveries such as the nuclear smuggling activities of A. Q. Khan.
Others claim PSI is ineffective and question whether its activities can receive
adequate Congressional oversight.  For many, combating criminal activities requires
utilizing a diversity of institutions, some more bureaucratic than others.
Some experts propose expanding Interpol’s capabilities and giving it
enforcement power.  Others — while acknowledging the 184-country organization’s
value and global reach — believe Interpol may inevitably confront a variety of
challenges.  Effectively sharing information and enforcing laws over such a wide
spectrum of countries is difficult at best.  It has been argued that U.S. efforts are
better spent working with regional structures.  Organizations such as the European
Union (EU)’s Europol or Southeast Asia’s Aseanapol may receive more political
backing and funding.  Typically more familiar with each other and frequently sharing
similar crime problems, participating nations may be more willing to share
information, harmonize laws, and cooperate in law enforcement.
Some observers are concerned that forming agreements with institutions such
as the European Union could damage or water down existing bilateral agreements.
Under the Bush Administration, the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland
Security, the FBI, the CIA, and other agencies have actively worked to enhance
coordination with their EU law enforcement and intelligence counterparts.
Administration treaties include two with the European Union on extradition and
mutual legal assistance, and two information sharing agreements with Europol.
Some Administration officials have claimed they will continue to pursue U.S.-EU
agreements without harming current bilateral relationships.55
Effective Government/Private-Sector Partnerships
The private sector already plays a major role in combating transnational
organized crime.  The American financial sector, for example, under the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), is charged with monitoring itself for illicit
transactions and actively sharing information with the government.  Some experts
fear that further regulating the financial, technology, communications, and other
industries would hinder their growth and increase government costs.  In certain cases,
many Americans may have privacy concerns about government involvement in the
private sector.  
Many experts advocate more government/private-sector partnerships.  For
example, companies with extensive transportation networks could assume greater
responsibility for contraband and dangerous materials inspection.  The government
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could randomly audit these areas, and, in return, decrease burdensome customs
inspections for companies at borders.
Leveraging Technology
Some experts advocate expanding the development of technology to detect,
track, and protect against criminal activities.  Congress may face decisions over
which, if any, programs to fund.  In recent years, crime detection has benefitted from
powerful new modeling software and data-mining tools.  Many banks, for example,
are using money laundering software that can sift through millions of transactions to
spot suspicious patterns.  Government agencies are turning to similar programs to
detect and map criminal activities.  Aiming to fight illicit trade by improving product
identification and authenticity, radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) are
becoming more widespread.  Some agencies propose greater development and use
of biometric technology, which identifies people through unique physical
characteristics.  The European Union is working to include biometric indicators on
its passports, and the United States is expanding biometric recognition requirements
for foreigners entering the country.56
Focusing Federal Efforts Against Organized Crime
Some experts propose easing certain laws to allow the government to
concentrate its limited resources on the most pressing criminal activities.  For
example, some advocate decriminalizing the possession of small amounts of
marijuana.  Others, concerned that the government may be overwhelmed, have
proposed legalizing some counterfeit products and easing certain piracy restrictions.
Intellectual property-related legal changes would probably require contentious
negotiations with affected U.S. industries.  Approaches such as these can be
controversial and politically difficult; critics believe they risk sending society an
inappropriate message.  But some argue that similar strategies are already employed.
The United States, for example, has taken steps to regularize the status of certain
illegal immigrants.  Many foreign countries have reduced legal penalties for
marijuana possession.  Some experts propose more funding for studies on various
policies’ economic and social effects.
Conclusion
An improved understanding of international organized crime’s dynamics might
help Congress as it coordinates, funds, and oversees anti-crime policies and
programs.  Improved data collection and establishing a clear picture of the relative
threats posed by various criminal activities would clearly be helpful.  In addition, a
closer scrutiny of the nexus between crime and terror could improve the
government’s ability to fight both.  Stronger international law enforcement
cooperation and more effective government partnerships with the private sector both
may be central to effectively combating transnational organized crime.
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Appendix:  U.S. Efforts Against Transnational
Organized Crime:  Agency Roles and Congressional
Action
This appendix describes key U.S. programs, initiatives, and legislation to
combat transnational crime.  It provides additional information on the five criminal
areas discussed in “Key Federal Programs and Initiatives,” above.
WMD Smuggling
U.S. anti-nuclear smuggling efforts are coordinated by the Departments of State,
Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, and other agencies.
State and Defense Departments.  These agencies lead coordination of the
Proliferation Security Initiative.  Announced by President Bush in May 2003, it
creates international agreements and partnerships to permit the United States and its
allies to search planes and ships suspected of carrying nuclear material or
technologies.  In addition, the DOD-managed Cooperative Threat Reduction program
works to destroy nuclear weapons, especially in the former Soviet Union.  The State
Department also funds the International Science and Technology Centers in Russia
and Ukraine to help employ scientists with nonweapons-related projects. 
Energy Department.  DOE runs several programs to secure nuclear weapons
and weapons-usable nuclear materials.  The International Materials Protection,
Control, and Accounting program works in the former Soviet Union and other
countries.  Its activities include upgrading security at nuclear sites, consolidating
material into more secure locations, and improving nuclear smuggling detection
capabilities at borders.  The President’s FY2007 budget requests about $1.12 billion
for Energy, State, and Defense Department programs that provide nonproliferation
and threat reduction assistance to Russia and other former Soviet states.  This
compares to about $1.02 billion appropriated in FY2006.  The FY2007 request
includes $372.1 million for DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, down
from $415.5 million in FY2006.  The request includes $675 million for Energy
Department WMD threat-reduction efforts, up from $530 in FY2006.  It also calls
for $75 million in comparable State Department funding, up from $71 million in
FY2006.57
Homeland Security Department.  The goal of the Container Security
Initiative, launched in January 2002 by the former U.S. Customs Service (now part
of DHS) is to increase inspection of the approximately seven million shipping
containers entering the U.S. annually.  DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
is generally charged with protecting U.S. borders from incoming nuclear material.
Its efforts include border patrols, seaport security, and customs inspections.  DHS
also leads interagency efforts to develop technology to protect the United States from
WMD threats. 
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Commerce Department.  Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security
(BIS) is responsible for safeguarding U.S. national security and for promoting its
foreign policy and economic interests by implementing U.S. export-control policy on
dual-use commodities, software, and technology.  As part of the State Department’s
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program (EXBS), BIS helps
other countries develop and enforce effective export controls through workshops,
training, and other activities.
Recent Legislative Activity.  A number of nuclear black market-related
proposals are contained in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2006 and
FY2007 (H.Rept. 109-168, H.R. 2601).  Title VIII, the Nuclear Black Market
Elimination Act, has four basic components.  These are: sanctions, penalties for
corporate entities associated with proliferation activities, incentives for
proliferation-interdiction cooperation, and nonproliferation conditions required to
receive U.S. assistance.  Another H.R. 2601 section calls for the U.S. government to
ask Pakistan for direct access to A.Q. Khan in order to further investigate his nuclear
smuggling activities.58 
Drug Trafficking
A number of U.S. agencies, coordinated mainly by the State Department’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), run anti-drug
programs and initiatives.  U.S. anti-narcotics efforts center primarily on foreign crop
eradication and global narcotics interdiction.  The State Department and other
agencies help eradicate crops by providing foreign countries with equipment and
supplies. 
State Department.  INL manages the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI),
the primary U.S. program supporting counternarcotics and economic development
in the Andean region.59  ACI funding from FY2000 through FY2004 totals about $3.5
billion.  Congress appropriated $731 million for ACI in FY2005; $734.5 million was
approved for FY2006.  The White House is requesting $721.5 million for FY2007.
INL also leads other agencies in training and assisting foreign law enforcement,
managing interagency coordination of programs such as the International Law
Enforcement Academies (ILEAs).  ILEAs train foreign personnel and promote
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international legal cooperation.60  They have trained over 13,000 officials from 68
countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) also funds a variety of
anti-narcotics programs.  Many promote education, institutional development, and
alternative employment for people involved in drug production.  AID also provides
balance of payments support to compensate countries (especially Andean) forgoing
drug export revenue.
Justice Department.  Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents cooperate
with law enforcement agencies in 58 countries in activities such as bilateral
investigations, institution building, and training.  In the Justice-led Southwest Border
Initiative (SWBI), several federal agencies work to combat Mexico- and Colombia-
based trafficking groups operating along the Southwest Border.  Working in concert,
the DEA, the FBI, the U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Attorneys’ offices around the
country conduct wiretaps aimed at tracking drug movements and identifying
traffickers.  DEA and other Justice Department officials play a central role in
bringing smugglers to face justice in the United States through extradition, a
significant judicial tool in combating narcotics. 
Defense Department.  DOD responsibilities include heading federal efforts
to detect aerial and maritime drug trafficking toward the United States.  DOD
analysts also work with DEA and other U.S. agents to execute anti-narcotics actions
in key drug production and transit countries. 
Recent Legislative Activity.  The FY2006 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057) authorizes $734.5 million for ACI in
FY2006.  In addition, the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-
163, H.R. 1815), signed by the President on January 6, 2006, authorizes $901.7
million for Defense Department global drug interdiction.  Unlike the FY2005
authorization, it did not include provisions relating to Colombia or the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative.61 
Trafficking in Persons
 Interagency anti-trafficking efforts are led by the State Department.  Other
agencies, including the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services,
Homeland Security, and Labor, also play key roles.
State Department.  The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
of 2000 (P.L. 106-386), signed into law October 28, 2000, contained several key
anti-trafficking provisions.  One established an annual State Department Trafficking
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in Persons Report.  First issued in July 2001, it reviews anti-trafficking trends and
rates countries’ anti-trafficking efforts.  
P.L. 106-386 also authorizes the President to impose sanctions, under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223), against countries that
do not meet anti-trafficking “minimum standards.”62  Also authorized was the
Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons.  Created in
2002, it includes the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Labor,
and other top officials.  It receives assistance from the State Department Office to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons.
Justice Department.  The Trafficking in Persons and Worker Exploitation
Task Force, established by the Justice and Labor Departments, is charged with
coordinating anti-trafficking investigations and prosecutions.  On January 24, 2002,
the Attorney General announced the implementation of a special “T” visa, authorized
under P.L. 106-386, to assist trafficking victims cooperating with law enforcement
officials.  Victims facing significant retribution or other risks upon returning abroad
may be granted permission to remain in the United States and are eligible to apply
for permanent residency after three years. 
Recent Legislative Activity.  On October 7, 2005, the Senate ratified the
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,63
to which the United States became a party on December 3, 2005.  Currently 113
countries have signed the Protocol, with 94 countries party to the agreement.
On January 10, 2006, the President signed the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-164).  Among other things, the bill aims to
assist foreign trafficking victims in the United States, address the needs of child
victims, and develop anti-trafficking programs in post-conflict situations and foreign
humanitarian emergencies.  It authorizes $188 million in 2006 and $173 million in
2007 to combat human trafficking.64  
Intellectual Property (IP) Crimes
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) leads other
agencies including the Departments of Commerce, State, Justice, and Homeland
Security in combating IP violations.
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USTR.  A centerpiece of U.S. efforts to strengthen IP enforcement is the annual
USTR-led “Special 301 process,”65 which seeks to identify countries lacking
adequate intellectual property protection.  If a trading partner is identified as a
Priority Foreign Country (PFC), the USTR has 30 days to decide whether to
investigate the countries’ questionable policies.  Such an investigation can lead to
separate intellectual property agreements with the PFC or to U.S. trade sanctions.
USTR also manages several tariff preference programs, such as the Generalized
System of Preferences.66    
Many U.S. anti-piracy initiatives involve forging international agreements, often
through the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Through the WTO, the USTR can
initiate dispute settlement proceedings against foreign governments and institutions;
a stringent WTO membership application process also promotes tougher IP laws.
Free trade agreements (FTA) help, too; FTA partner nations must bring their
enforcement regimes up to U.S. legal standards, as mandated by the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210).67
In October 2004 the Administration launched the interagency Strategy Targeting
Organized Piracy (STOP!), which aims to strengthen existing anti-piracy efforts and
includes new actions such as the creation of a government IP complaint hotline. 
Homeland Security Department.  DHS’s efforts include seizing pirated
goods at U.S. borders and ports.  According to the agency, it made more than 7,200
seizures valued at nearly $140 million in FY2004.  Chinese goods comprised almost
70% of this value.  DHS is developing a risk-assessment computer model to help
target suspected shipments.
Recent Legislative Activity.  The 109th Congress has seen a number of
legislative actions related to trade and IP violations.  The United States Trade Rights
Enforcement Act (H.R. 3283), for example, would boost funding and increase
enforcement through several federal agencies.  Among other things, it would
authorize an additional $6 million for the USTR beyond the President’s budget
request for FY2006 and FY2007, for a total of $44.78 million and $47.02 million,
respectively.  H.R. 3283 passed on July 27, 2005.  A similar bill, S. 1421, has been
introduced in the Senate.
Another bill, H.R. 4186, would create a Chief Trade Prosecutor to ensure
compliance with trade agreements.  Separate legislation, S. 2317, would require the
USTR to identify trade enforcement priorities, take action with respect to priority
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foreign country trade practices, and establish within the USTR’s office a Chief
Enforcement Officer and a Trade Enforcement Working Group.68
Money Laundering
U.S. anti-money laundering efforts are coordinated by the Departments of
Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security, and other agencies. 
Department of Treasury.  The Office of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence (TFI) and its subsidiary bureaus safeguard domestic and foreign financial
systems through financial sanctions, financial regulation and supervision,
international initiatives, private sector outreach, law enforcement support, and other
methods.  TFI offices such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
support U.S. law enforcement agencies in international financial crime investigations
and provide U.S. policymakers with global money laundering analyses. 
FinCEN and other Treasury affiliates cooperate with 32 foreign government
institutions to improve international money laundering standards through the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  FinCEN also participates in global anti-money
laundering networks.  The Egmont Group is comprised of FinCEN and 100 similar
international agencies.  Egmont works to expand, systematize, and secure
information sharing among its members.
Department of Justice.  The Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section guides law enforcement agencies on money laundering-related investigations
and prosecutions.  It also coordinates multi-district investigations and prosecutions,
develops regulatory and legislative initiatives, and ensures uniform application of
forfeiture and money laundering statutes.
Homeland Security Department.  U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) manages a handful of money laundering programs and initiatives.
Its Financial Investigative Program investigates money laundering crimes involving
drugs, human smuggling, telemarketing fraud, and counterfeit goods trafficking.
ICE’s domestic and international money laundering operations are coordinated
through its Money Laundering Coordination Center.
Recent Legislative Activity.  The USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act (P.L. 109-177, H.R. 3199), contains significant language on
money laundering.  Signed by President Bush on March 9, 2006, it will, among other
things, increase penalties for financing terrorist activities and place greater
restrictions on certain money-transferring businesses.69
